Kalafatis/Tzakas, The Greek Leniency Program in the light of the recently published European Notice and US practice, Dikaio Epiheiriseon & Etairion (Business and Company Law) 2007, p. 165 ff.
Limited resources for discovering collusive and price fixing practices mean that Leniency Programs are regarded as the main factor in strengthening the effectiveness of competition policy against cartels. Based on acknowledged principles of economics, the main objective of these mechanisms is to diminish the incentives and benefits of joint illegal behavior by granting those undertakings that reveal information to the authorities substantial reductions in fines, thus leading to an "inside" collapse of collusive agreements.
In the light of longstanding US and European experience, a similar mechanism was introduced not long ago into the Greek legal system. Although it is too early to evaluate the effects of the Leniency Policy at a national level, by highlighting recent developments at European and US level this article attempts to investigate its desistence and deterrence properties, to indicate aspects that might prove confusing in practice and to demonstrate the interaction between Leniency Programs and effective private antitrust enforcement. |
